Martin Wolf
@ New York Review of Books focuses on Europe's massive policy failure:
Austerity has failed. It turned a nascent recovery into
stagnation. That imposes huge and unnecessary costs, not just in the
short run, but also in the long term: the costs of investments unmade,
of businesses not started, of skills atrophied, and of hopes destroyed.
What
is being done here in the UK and also in much of the eurozone is worse
than a crime, it is a blunder. If policymakers listened to the arguments
put forward by our opponents, the picture, already dark, would become
still darker.
How Austerity Aborted Recovery
Austerity
came to Europe in the first half of 2010, with the Greek crisis, the
coalition government in the UK, and above all, in June of that year, the
Toronto summit of the group of twenty leading countries. This meeting
prematurely reversed the successful stimulus launched at the previous
summits and declared, roundly, that “advanced economies have committed
to fiscal plans that will at least halve deficits by 2013.”
This
was clearly an attempt at austerity, which I define as a reduction in
the structural, or cyclically adjusted, fiscal balance—i.e., the budget
deficit or surplus that would exist after adjustments are made for the
ups and downs of the business cycle. It was an attempt prematurely and
unwisely made. The cuts in these structural deficits, a mix of tax
increases and government spending cuts between 2010 and 2013, will be
around 11.8 percent of potential GDP in Greece, 6.1
percent in Portugal, 3.5 percent in Spain, and 3.4 percent in Italy. One
might argue that these countries have had little choice. But the UK
did, yet its cut in the structural deficit over these three years will
be 4.3 percent of GDP.
What was the consequence? In a word, “dire.”
In
2010, as a result of heroic interventions by the monetary and fiscal
authorities, many countries hit by the crisis enjoyed surprisingly good
recoveries from the “great recession” of 2008–2009. This then stopped
(see figure 1). The International Monetary Fund now thinks, perhaps
optimistically, that the British economy will expand by 1.8 percent
between 2010 and 2013. But it expanded by 1.8 percent between 2009 and
2010 alone. The economy has now stagnated for almost three years. Even
if the IMF is right about a recovery this year, it will be 2015 before the economy reaches the size it was before the crisis began.
The picture in the eurozone is worse: its economy expanded by 2
percent between 2009 and 2010. It is now forecast to expand by a mere
0.4 percent between 2010 and 2013. Austerity has put the crisis-hit
countries through a wringer, with huge and ongoing recessions. Rates of
unemployment are more than a quarter of the labor force in Greece and
Spain (see figure 2).
When the economies of many neighboring
countries contract simultaneously, the impact is far worse since one
country’s reduced spending on imports is another country’s reduced
export demand. This is why the concerted decision to retrench was a huge
mistake. It aborted the recovery, undermining confidence in our economy
and causing long-term damage.
Why Fiscal Policy
Why is strong fiscal support needed
after a financial crisis? The answer for the crisis of recent years is
that, with the credit system damaged and asset prices falling,
short-term interest rates quickly fell to the lower boundary—that is,
they were cut to nearly zero. Today, the highest interest rate offered
by any of the four most important central banks is half a percent. Used
in conjunction with monetary policy, aggressive and well-designed fiscal
stimulus is the most effective response to the huge decrease in
spending by individuals as they try to save money in order to pay down
debt. This desire for higher savings is the salient characteristic of
the post–financial crisis economy, which now characterizes the US,
Europe, and Japan. Together these three still make up more than 50
percent of the world economy.
Of course, some think that neither
monetary nor fiscal policy should be used. Instead, they argue, we
should “liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers,
liquidate real estate.” In other words, sell everything until they reach
a rock-bottom price at which point, supposedly, the economy will
readjust and spending and investing will resume.
That, according to
Herbert Hoover, was the advice he received from Andrew Mellon, the
Treasury secretary, as America plunged into the Great Depression. Mellon
thought government should do nothing. This advice manages to be both
stupid and wicked. Stupid, because following it would almost certainly
lead to a depression across the advanced world. Wicked, because of the
misery that would follow.
Austerity in the Eurozone
Some will insist that the eurozone countries had no alternative: they had to retrench.
This
is true in the sense that members have limited sovereignty, wed as they
are to a single currency, and had to adapt to the dysfunctional
eurozone policy regime. Yet it did not have to be this way.
1.
The creditor countries, particularly Germany, could have recognized
that they were enjoying incredibly low interest rates on their own
public debt partly because of the crises in the vulnerable countries. They could have shared some of this windfall they enjoyed with those under pressure.
2. The needed adjustment could have been made far more symmetrical, with strong action in creditor countries to expand demand.
3.
The European Central Bank could have offered two years earlier the kind
of open-ended support for debt of hard-pressed countries that it made
available in the summer of 2012.
4. The funds made available to cushion the crisis could have been substantially larger.
5.
The emphasis could then have been more on structural reforms, such as
easing labor regulations and union protections that restrain hiring and
firing and raise labor costs, and less on fiscal retrenchment in the
form of reduced spending. Reduced labor costs could have made these
nations’ export industries more competitive and encouraged domestic
hiring.
It is possible to admit all this and yet argue
that without deep slumps, the necessary pressure for adjustment in labor
costs that is inherent in the adoption of a single currency (which is a
modern version of the gold-standard-type mechanism that once ruled the
advanced nations and helped bring on the Great Depression) would not
have existed.
This, too, is in general not true.
1.
In Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, at least, the private sector
was in such a deep crisis that additional downward pressure as a result
of rapid fiscal retrenchment simply added insult—and more
unemployment—to deep injury.
2. In Italy, the
pressure from years of semi-stagnation, with many more to come, would
probably have been sufficient to restructure the labor markets, to bring
about lower labor costs, provided structural reforms of the labor
market were carried out, measures allowing companies to reduce their
workforces and adjust wages more easily.
In short, the scale of the austerity was unnecessary and ill-timed. This is now widely admitted.
Austerity in the UK
The UK certainly did
have alternatives—a host of them. It could have chosen from a wide
range of different fiscal policies. The government could, for example,
have:
1. Increased public investment, rather than halving
it (initially decided by Labour), when it enjoyed zero real interest
rates on long-term borrowing.
2. It could have cut taxes.
3. It could have slowed the pace of reduction in current spending.
It could, in brief, have preserved more freedom to respond to the exceptional circumstances it confronted.
Why did the government not do so?
1.
It believed, and was advised to believe, that monetary policy alone
could do the job. But monetary policy is hard to calibrate when interest
rates are already so low (at or close to zero) and potentially damaging
particularly in the form of asset bubbles. Fiscal policy is not only
more direct, but it can also be more easily calibrated and, when the
time comes, more easily reversed.
2. The
government believed that its fiscal plans gave it credibility and so
would deliver lower long-term interest rates. But what determines
long-term interest rates for a sovereign country with a floating
exchange rate is the expected future short-term interest rates. These
rates are determined by the state of the economy, not that of the public
finances. In the emergency budget of June 2010, the cumulative net
borrowing of the public sector between 2011 and 2015–2016 had been
forecast to be £322 billion; in the June 2013 budget, this borrowing is
forecast at £539.4 billion, that is, 68 percent more. Has this failure
destroyed confidence and so raised long-term interest rates on
government bonds? No.
3. It believed that high
government deficits would crowd out private spending—that is, the need
of the government to borrow would leave less room for private borrowing.
But after a huge financial crisis, there is no such crowding out
because private firms are reluctant to invest, and consumers are
reluctant to spend, in a weak economic environment.
4.
It argued that the UK had too much debt. But the UK government started
the crisis with close to its lowest net public debt relative to gross
domestic product in three hundred years. It still has a debt ratio much
lower than its long-term historical average (which is about 110 percent
of GDP).
5. The government
argued that the UK could not afford additional debt. But that, of
course, depends on the cost of debt. When debt is as cheap as it is
today, the UK can hardly afford not to borrow. It is impossible to
believe that the country cannot find public investments—the cautious IMF
itself urges more spending on infrastructure—that will generate
positive real returns. Indeed, with real interest rates negative,
borrowing is close to a “free lunch.”
6. The
government now believes that the UK has very little excess capacity. But
even the most pessimistic analysts believe it has some. Of course, the
right policy would address both demand and supply, together. But I, for
one, cannot accept that the UK is fated to produce 16 percent less than
its pre-crisis trend of growth suggested. Yes, some of that output was
exaggerated. There is no reason to believe so much was.
Assessment of Austerity
We,
on this side of the argument, are certainly not stating that premature
austerity is the only reason for weak economies: the financial crisis,
the subsequent end of the era of easy credit, and the adverse shocks are
crucial. But austerity has made it far more difficult than it needed to
be to deal with these shocks.
The right approach to a crisis of
this kind is to use everything: policies that strengthen the banking
system; policies that increase private sector incentives to invest;
expansionary monetary policies; and, last but not least, the
government’s capacity to borrow and spend.
Failing to do this, in
the UK, or failing to make this possible, in the eurozone, has helped
cause a lamentably weak recovery that is very likely to leave
long-lasting scars. It was a huge mistake. It is not too late to change
course.
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