William Black is a former bank regulator and author of "The Best Way To Rob a Bank Is To Own One" - via
Naked Capitalism:
What do you get when you throw together economic fraudsters,
plutocrats and opportunistic criminals? A financial crisis, that’s what.
If you look back over the massive frauds that have swept the country in
recent decades, from the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s to the
2007-'08 financial crash, this deadly combination always appears.
A dangerous cycle begins when prominent economists pander to
plutocrats and bought politicians, who reward them with top posts, where
they promote the perverse economic policies that cause fraud epidemics.
Crises develop, and millions of people are ripped off. Those who fight
for truth are ignored or ruined. The criminals get wealthier, bolder and
more politically powerful, and go on to hatch even more devastating
cons.
The three most recent financial crises in U.S. history were driven by
a special type of fraud called “control fraud” — cases where the
officers who control what look like legitimate entities use them as
“weapons” to commit crimes. Each time, Alan Greenspan, former chairman
of the Federal Reserve, played a catastrophic role. First, his policies
created the fraud-friendly (criminogenic) environment that produces
epidemics of control fraud, then he failed to identify those epidemics
and incipient crises, and finally, he failed to counter them.
At the heart of Greenspan’s failure lies an ethical void in the brand
of economics that has dominated American universities and policy
circles for the last several decades, a brand known as “free market
fundamentalism” or the “neoclassical school.” (I call it “theoclassical
economics” for its quasi-religious belief system.) Mainstream economists
who follow this school assert a deeply flawed and controversial concept
known as the “efficient market hypothesis,” which holds that financial
markets magically regulate themselves (they automatically
“self-correct”) and are thus immune to fraud. When an economist starts
believing in that kind of fallacy, he is bound to become blind to
reality. Let’s take a look at what blinded Greenspan:
- Greenspan knew that markets were “efficient” because the efficient
market hypothesis is the foundational pillar underlying modern finance
theory.
- Markets can’t be efficient if there is control fraud, so there must not be any.
- Wait, there are control frauds! Tens of thousands of them.
- Then control fraud must not really be harmful, or markets would not be efficient.
- Control fraud, therefore, must not be immoral. As crime boss Emilio Barzini put it in The Godfather, “It’s just business.”
As delusional and immoral as this “logic” chain is, many elite
economists believe it. This warped perspective has spawned policies so
perverse that they turn the world of finance into the optimal
environment for criminals. The upshot is that most of our elite
financial leaders and professionals have thrown integrity out the
window, and we end up with recurrent, intensifying financial crises, de facto immunity
for our most elite criminals, and the rise of crony capitalism. Let’s
do a little time travel to see exactly how this plays out.
How to Stoke a Savings and Loan Fiasco
The Lincoln Savings and Loan Association of Irvine, California was at
the center of the famous crisis that rocked the financial world in the
1980s. A once prudently run company morphed into a casino when S&L
associations became deregulated and started doing risky business with
depositors’ money.
Businessman, GOP darling, and anti-pornography
crusader Charles Keating, ironically nicknamed “Mr. Clean,” took over
Lincoln in 1984 and got the casino rolling. (It was a special kind of
casino where the games were rigged – and not in favor of newlywed brides
who were the subject of sexual extortion in Casablanca.) In a classic case of control fraud, Keating devoted himself to turning the company
into a weapon of mass financial destruction and a source of wealth for
his family. Keating’s “weapon of choice” for his frauds was accounting.
Keating went on a spree buying land, taking equity positions in real
estate projects, and purchasing junk bonds. In 1985, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), where I was the staffer leading the regulation
efforts, grew alarmed at the new activities of savings associations like
Lincoln. So we made a rule: S&Ls could not put more than 10 percent
of company assets in "direct investments” – an activity that led to very large losses.
Alan Greenspan, chairman of an economic consulting firm at the time,
urged us to permit Lincoln Savings to go full steam ahead. His memo
supporting Lincoln’s application to make hundreds of millions of dollars
in direct investments praised the company’s management (Keating) and
claimed that Lincoln Savings “posed no foreseeable risk of loss.”
The FHLBB rejected Lincoln’s request to exceed the rule’s threshold
because direct investments were a superb vehicle for accounting fraud –
they made it easy to hide losses and to create fictional income.
Nevertheless, Lincoln continued to violate the rule and created
fictional (backdated) board consents with hundreds of forged signatures
to make it appear that the investments were “grandfathered” under the
rule. The hundreds of millions of dollars in unlawful direct investments
were used for fraudulent purposes by Lincoln Savings’ controlling
officers and caused enormous losses – many of them to elderly citizens
who were conned into buying the junk bonds of Lincoln Savings’ holding
company. The massive losses on Lincoln’s illegal direct investments were
a major reason those bonds were worthless.
Hoping to use his political clout to continue the fraud, Keating
hired Greenspan to lobby the senators who eventually became the known as
the “Keating Five.” I remember well when these senators intervened at
Keating’s request to try to prevent me and my colleagues from taking an
enforcement action (or conservatorship) that would have saved over a
billion dollars. (I took the notes of that meeting, which led to the
Senate ethics investigation of the Keating Five.) The cronyism was so
thick in Washington that William Weld, then a top Department of Justice
official and later the Republican governor of Massachusetts, actually
tried to gin up a criminal investigation of the regulators rather than
Keating at the request of Lincoln’s lawyers who had just left the DOJ!
Eventually, Keating and many of the senior managers of Lincoln Savings
were convicted of felonies and Lincoln Savings became the most expensive
failure of the S&L debacle.
When you look back on this expensive fiasco, you see that the work of
respected professional economists was frequently called upon to support
the fraudulent activities. One of the ways Greenspan tried to advance
Keating’s effort to have the courts strike down the direct investment
rule was to use a study conducted by a less famous economist, George
Benston, who showed that S&Ls that violated the direct investment
rule earned higher profits than those who didn’t. So he recommended the
rule be dropped. Small problem: In less than two years all 33 of the companies Benston studied had failed. Most were accounting control frauds in which executives cooked the books to show fictional profits.
Keating had a talent for obtaining endorsements from prominent
economists. He got Daniel Fischel to conduct a study that purported to show
that Lincoln Savings was the best S&L in America. Fischel invoked
the efficient market hypothesis to opine that our examiners provided no
useful information because the markets had already perfectly taken into
account any information to which we had access. In reality, of course,
this was nonsense, and Lincoln Savings was the worst S&L in the
country.
Economists who pander to plutocrats have a great advantage over
scholars in other fields: There is no reputational penalty among your
peers for being dead wrong. Benston got an endowed chair at Emory,
Fischel was made dean of the Univerisity of Chicago’s Law School, and
Greenspan was made Chairman of the Fed. Those who got control fraud
right and fought the elite scams and their powerful political patrons –
people like Edwin Gray, head of the FHLBB, and Joe Selby, head of
supervision in Texas – saw their careers ended.
Consider what that perverse pattern indicates about how badly ethics have fallen in the both economics and government.
How to Create a Regulatory Black Hole
Alan Greenspan was Ayn Rand’s protégé, but he moved radically to the
wacky side of Rand on the issue of financial fraud. And that, friends,
is pretty wacky. Greenspan pushed the idea that preventing fraud was not
a legitimate basis for regulation, and said so in a famous encounter
with Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chair Brooksley
Born. “I don’t think there is any need for a law against fraud,” Born
recalls Greenspan telling her. Greenspan actually believed the market
would sort itself out if any fraud occurred. Born knew she had a
powerful foe on any regulation.
She was right. Greenspan, with the rabid support of the Rubin wing of
the Clinton administration, along with Republican Chairman of the
Senate Banking Committee Phil Gramm, crushed Born’s effort to regulate
credit default swaps (CDS). The plutocrats and their political allies
deliberately created what’s known as a regulatory black hole – a place
where elite criminals could commit their crimes under the cover of
perpetual night.
Greenspan chose another Fed economist, Patrick Parkinson, to testify
on behalf of the bill to create the regulatory black hole for these
dangerous financial instruments. Parkinson offered the old line that
efficient markets easily excluded fraud — otherwise, they wouldn’t be
efficient markets! (Parkinson would later tell the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission in 2011 that the “whole concept” of a related
financial instrument known as an “ABS CDO” had been an “abomination”).
Greenspan’s successor richly rewarded Parkinson for being stunningly
wrong in his belief: Ben Bernanke appointed Parkinson — who had no
experience as a supervisor or examiner — as the Fed’s head of
supervision.
Lynn Turner, former chief accountant of the SEC, told me of
Greenspan’s infamous question to his group of senior officials who met
at the Fed in late 1998 or early 1999 (roughly the same time as
Greenspan’s conversation with Born): "Why does it matter if the banks
are allowed to fudge their numbers a little bit?" What’s wrong with a
“little bit” of fraud?
Conservatives often support the “broken windows” theory of criminal
activity, which asserts that you stop serious blue-collar crime by
cracking down on minor offenses. Yet mysteriously, they never apply the
concept to white-collar financial crimes by elites. The little-bit-of
fraud-is-ok concept got made into law in the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, which created the regulatory black hole for
credit default swaps. That black hole was compounded by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission under the leadership of Wendy Gramm, spouse
of Senator Phil Gramm.
Enron’s fraudulent leaders were delighted to exploit that black hole,
because they were engaged in a massive control fraud. They appointed
Wendy Gramm to their board of directors and proceeded to use derivatives
to manipulate prices and aid their cartel in driving electricity prices
far higher on the Pacific Coast. In a bizarre irony, the massive
increase in prices led to the defeat of California Governor Gray Davis
(the leading opponent of the cartel) and his replacement by Governor
Schwarzenegger – a man who was part of the group that met secretly with
Enron’s leadership to try to defeat Davis’s efforts to get the federal
regulators to kill the cartel.
How damaging was Greenspan’s dogmatic and delusional defense of elite
financial frauds in the case of Enron? If you look closely, you can see
that Enron brought together all the critical elements of a financial
crisis: big-time accounting control fraud, derivatives, cartels, and the
use of off-balance sheet scams to inflate income and hide real losses
and leverage. On top of all that, many of the world’s largest banks
aided Enron and its extremely creative CFO Andrew Fastow to create
frauds. The Fed could have responded by adopting and enforcing mandates
to end the criminal practices that were driving the epidemic, but it
didn’t. Instead, Greenspan and other Fed economists championed Enron’s
leadership and cited the company as proof that regulation was
unnecessary to prevent control fraud. They were so extreme that they
attacked their own senior supervisors for daring to criticize the banks’
role in aiding and abetting Enron’s activities.
Later, when risky derivatives activities and control frauds at large
financial institutions were pushing us toward the catastrophic crash of
2007-2008, the Fed took no meaningful action based on the lessons
learned from Enron. Greenspan and the senior leadership of the Fed had
learned absolutely nothing, which shows how disabling economic dogma is
to regulators – making them worse than simply useless. They become
harmful, again attacking their supervisors for criticizing the banks’
fraudulent “liar’s” loans. When Bernanke placed Patrick Parkinson (an
economist blind to fraud by elite banksters) in a supervisory role at
the Fed, he sealed the fate of millions of Americans whose financial
well-being would be sucked right into that regulatory black hole – and
removed the ability of the accursed supervisors to criticize the largest
banks.
How to Protect Predatory Lenders
Finally, we come to the mortgage meltdown of 2008, when the entire
housing industry went into freefall. Central to this crisis is the story
of the liar's loan — mortgage-industry slang for a mortgage that a
lender gives without checking tax returns, employment history, or
anything else that might reliably indicate that the borrower can make
the payments.
The Fed, and only the Fed, had authority under the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) to ban liar’s loans by all lenders. At a
series of hearings mandated by Congress, dozens of witnesses
representing home mortgage borrowers and state and local criminal
investigators urged the Fed to do this. The testimony included a study
that found a 90 percent incidence of fraud in liar’s loans.
What did Greenspan and Bernanke do? Exactly nothing. They consistently refused to act.
Greenspan went so far as to refuse pleas to send Fed examiners into
bank holding company affiliates to find the facts and collect data on
liar’s loans.
Simultaneously, the Fed’s economists dismissed the
warnings from progressives about fraudulent liar’s loans as “merely
anecdotal.” In 2005, the desperate Fed regulators, blocked by Greenspan
from sending in the examiners to get data from the banks, resorted to
simply sending a letter to the largest banks requesting information. The
Fed supervisor who received the banks’ response to that letter termed
the data “very alarming.”
If you suspect that the banks would typically respond to such
requests by understating their problem assets significantly, then you
have the right instincts to be a financial regulator.
By 2003, loan quality was so bad that it could only be explained as
the inevitable product of endemic accounting control fraud and it
continued to collapse through 2007 until the bubble burst. By 2006, over
two million fraudulent liar’s loans were originated annually. We know
that it was overwhelmingly lenders and their agents who put the lies in
liar’s loans. Liar’s loans make the perfect “natural experiment” because
no governmental entity ever required a lender or a purchaser (and that
includes Fannie and Freddie) to make or purchase a liar’s loan. Banks
made, and purchased, trillions of dollars in liar’s loans because doing
so lined the pockets of their controlling officers.
The Fed’s leadership, dominated by economists devoted to false
theory, was enraged when the Fed’s supervisors presented evidence of
endemic control fraud by the most elite lenders, particularly in the
making of fraudulent liar’s loans. How dare the supervisors criticize
our most reputable bank CEOs by showing that they were making hundreds
of thousands through scams?
Bernanke finally acted under Congressional pressure on July 14, 2008
to ban liar’s loans. He cited evidence of endemic fraud available since
early 2006 – evidence which would have been available way back in 2001
had Greenspan moved to require examiners to study liar’s loans. Even in
the face of overwhelming evidence, Bernanke delayed the ban for 18
months — one would not wish to inconvenience a fraudulent lender, after
all.
We did not have to suffer this crisis. Economists who were not
blinded by neoclassical theory, like George Akerlof (who won the Nobel
Prize in 2001) and Christina Romer (adviser to President Obama from
2008-2010), had warned their colleagues about accounting control fraud
and liar’s loans, as did criminologists and regulators like me. But
Greenspan (and Timothy Geithner) refused to see the obvious truth.
Alan Greenspan had no excuse for assuming fraud out of existence, and
his exceptionally immoral position on fraud and regulation proved
catastrophic to America and much of the world. We cannot afford the
price, measured in many trillions of dollars, over 10 million jobs, and
endless suffering, of unethical economists.
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